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This paper analysis the intertemporal public ﬁnance decision under political
instability. The government’s choice between inﬂationary ﬁnance and foreign
debt is constrained by an interest rate, which is aﬀected both by market con-
ditions and debt conditionality. The main result is that there is typically a
trade-oﬀ between seigniorage taxation and foreign debt. There are two impli-
cations. First, monetary and ﬁscal solidity can typically not be achieved at the
same time. Second, myopic behaviour produced by political instability leads
to a reduction of seigniorage, not to an increase as argued, for instance, by
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (AER, 1992).
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Public ﬁnance decisions in many developing and transition countries are often plagued by
three political economy problems which reinforce one another. First, foreign and domestic
bondholders may have lost conﬁdence in any form of debt issue and are no longer willing
to hold government debt. Second, loans on international credit markets are curtailed or
expensive because of bad macroeconomic performance. In addition, international ﬁnancial
institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) apply conditions to their credits
(debt conditionality). Third, given that existing tax collection problems cannot be over-
come in the short run, it is appealing for any government to use seigniorage for ﬁnancing
government expenses.
On top of these obstacles, public ﬁnance decisions are typically also aﬀected by purely
political considerations. In particular, political instability is known to produce myopic
behaviour by the government in power. There are three literatures. In the ﬁrst two, a
government attempts to raise its chances for re-election by obtaining support through short
term measures. This is the argument of the traditional political business cycle literature
(e.g. Nordhaus, 1975) as well as the modern (endogenous) political instability literature
where the instability originates in electoral uncertainty (e.g. Tabellini and Alesina, 1990).
In the third literature a government faces an exogenous chance of loosing power. Examples
range from the threat of a coup d’´ etat or revolution to some other unforeseen event like a
terrorist attack as in Spain in March 2004. Under such political instability, the incumbent
government highly discounts the future in favour of short term gains (as, for instance,
in Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992).1 More cynically, one could say that the
government tries to secure the spoils at least for the foreseeable future. This third literature
(of exogenous political instability) is particularly relevant for unstable and more or less
1 In Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) the government prefers the immediate beneﬁt from
seigniorage to the longer term eﬀects of structural change. In Devereux and Wen (1998) the result is
more public spending at the expense of economic growth. Svenssson’s (1998) model produces a low level of
property rights investment, which hampers private investment in the future.
1authoritarian developing countries as well as for countries in transition.
The exogenous political instability literature typically incorporates an exogenous degree of
polarisation (or social heterogeneity), i.e. it accounts for conﬂicting interests in society.
There are two types of government as in the endogenous political instability literature,
but here their objectives are basically identical. They only diﬀer in that the two types of
policymakers (symmetrically) provide diﬀerent amounts of two public goods (or support
two group interests to diﬀerent degrees). In fact, the chance of another government with
opposite objectives taking over in the next period is what produces the political instability
and hence myopic behaviour.
This paper analysis the intertemporal public ﬁnance decision under exogenous political
instability and exogenous polarisation. The government ﬁnance decision is constrained by
the aforementioned absence of domestic debt and the inability to change tax base or tax rate.
Public goods are ﬁnanced by three sources of government revenue: a given proportional tax,
seigniorage and foreign debt. The amount of available debt is determined by an interest
rate, which is aﬀected both by market conditions and debt conditionality. In this setup,
the optimal choice of the government exhibits a trade-oﬀ between inﬂationary ﬁnance and
foreign debt.
This paper is diﬀerent to and improves the existing literature in several respects. First, it
provides a more comprehensive view of alternative sources of government revenue. Cukier-
man, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) model seigniorage and taxation, Devereux and Wen
(1998) capture domestic debt and taxation, and in Svenssson’s (1998) model, there is only
taxation. In contrast, this paper captures three alternative sources of government revenue.
In particular, the model in this paper includes foreign debt because foreign debt is a crucial
source of revenue in developing and transition countries with inherent (exogenous) political
instability. It can be shown that myopia produced by political instability results in the opti-
mal government choice of more foreign debt, but less seigniorage, because there is a trade-oﬀ
between seigniorage and foreign debt. This paper, therefore, contradicts Cukierman, Ed-
2wards and Tabellini’s (1992) ﬁnding that political instability leads to more seigniorage.
Furthermore, this paper complements two earlier papers by Bohn (2000 and 2002) which
both incorporate foreign debt. In Bohn (2000), Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini’s (1992)
ﬁnding of high levels of seigniorage under political instability is conﬁrmed. International
ﬁnancial institutions give credits in response to previous period monetary solidity,2 i.e. low
levels of seigniorage. This is a form of ex ante debt conditionality. The government tries
to comply in order to beneﬁt from foreign debt in the future. However, increased myopia
due to more political instability means more heavily discounted future beneﬁts. Hence the
government prefers high levels of seigniorage now while accepting less credits being made
available by international ﬁnancial institutions in the future. The situation is diﬀerent
in Bohn (2002). There, foreign credits depend on contemporaneous debt conditionality.
Myopia produced by political instability reduces the perceived burden of debt repayment
and the government wants to borrow as much as possible. This can be exploited by the
government by reducing seigniorage. Therefore, the ﬁndings in Bohn (2002) contradict those
in Bohn (2000) and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992).
In (Bohn, 2002), debt is modelled to be quantity-constrained to capture debt conditionality.
The country in question is supposed to have lost its credit-worthiness with commercial
lenders. In that context, it makes sense to assume a ﬁxed interest rate, at which, say, the
IMF, lends a certain amount of funds depending on some performance criteria. In this
paper, a broader view is taken. We assume that the country in question has full access to
international credit markets. There is no debt ceiling; instead, debt is price-constrained: the
more the country wants to borrow, the higher the interest rate. In addition, international
ﬁnancial institutions still exert some inﬂuence. If they withdraw (part of) their credits
because the country fails to fulﬁll certain debt conditionality criteria, the interest rate rises,
but the country is still able to borrow from commercial lenders.
2 The expressions ”monetary solidity” and ”ﬁscal solidity” are used instead of ”monetary and ﬁscal
stability” to avoid confusion with the term ”political stability”.
3In this paper, the main result is that the ﬁndings in Bohn (2002) are conﬁrmed in a more
general setting. There is typically a trade-oﬀ between seigniorage taxation and foreign
debt. Monetary and ﬁscal solidity can typically not be achieved at the same time. Myopic
behaviour produced by political instability leads to a reduction of seigniorage, not to an
increase as argued, for instance, by Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 to 5 present the intertemporal
framework of the theoretical model. Sections 6 to 9 summarize and simplify the government
maximization problem. Sections 10 to 12 discuss the impact of political instability and debt
conditionality. Section 13 concludes.
2 Model: Government Preferences and Political Instability
The model captures the intertemporal decision problem of the government, in particular
the optimal choice between revenue from debt and inﬂation tax. It consists of two periods:
period 1 (current period) and period 2 (ﬁnal period). There are two sectors in the economy:
(i) the government and (ii) the private sector. The model is speciﬁed in real terms.
Government preferences over periods 1 and 2 are given by the following total utility (or
welfare) function:
W = V1(C1) + H1(G1,F1) + E{ρ(V2(C2) + H2(G2,F2))}. (1)
The V.(•) functions are concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable utility functions of
the government in private sector consumption C (henceforth private consumption utility).
The H.(•) functions are utility functions in the government provision of public goods G
and F (henceforth public goods utility). E is the expectation operator and ρ < 1 is the
government discount factor. Total government utility is additively separable in two senses:
ﬁrst, with respect to periods; and second, with respect to utility derived either from private
consumption or from public goods provision.
4Assuming two types of governments (i.e. policymakers) political instability comprises two
features: (i) the probability of government change and (ii) political polarization. After the
ﬁrst period the incumbent government may loose oﬃce to the other set of policymakers with
a ﬁxed probability π; it stays in power with probability (1 − π).3 It is assumed that there
are two ethnic or social groups. Each one beneﬁts more from one of the two public goods.
Each of the two types of government provides both types of public goods, but to diﬀering
degrees. Political polarization then depends on the diﬀerences of policymakers’ preferences
with respect to their public good provision. The public goods utility function H is speciﬁed




min{αG,(1 − α)F}. (2)
For simplicity, their disagreement in public goods provision is parameterized symmetrically
by α which is exogenous. The denominator in equation (2) is a normalization such that
H(G,F) = F + G =: X, (3)
where X is the total public goods provision and the marginal public goods utility H0(X)
equals unity (cf. section 7 and appendix A). Without limiting the general validity of the
analysis, it is assumed that 1 ≤ α ≤ 1
2. When α equals half, the two types of government
have identical preferences; the more distant α is from half, the more they disagree on how
much to spend on each of the two public goods. If preferences of both policymaker types
are very dissimilar, political polarization is large. Political polarization measured by α
3 In a multi-period setting, this random change of government at ﬁxed intervals would be referred to as
Markov switching (or Markov chain). If several time periods were considered and their lengths were ﬁxed,
for instance, at six months, some governments would only be in power for half a year, fewer would last for
a year, and fewer yet for any longer period of time. This is a simple way of describing government change,
but it matches the situation in many developing or transitional countries. In Russia, for instance, there
were 5 changes of government in 1998 and 1999 despite the fact that no Duma or presidential elections were
held. President Yeltsin alternately replaced representatives of the nomenclature (Chernomyrdin, Primakov,
Putin) with so-called reformist Prime Ministers (Kirienko, Stepashin) in arbitrary and irregular intervals.
5contributes to political instability because it accounts for the extend of preference changes
given a change in government. For α equals half, the instability eﬀect of a government
change is eliminated.
3 Model: Budget Constraints
The government budget constraints for both model periods (1 and 2) are:
G1 + F1 ≤ τ ¯ Y + S1 + D. (4)
G2 + F2 + (1 + r)D ≤ τ ¯ Y + S2.
Real government expenditure consists of consumptive spending only (except for debt re-
payment in period 2). F1, G1, F2 and G2 are the amounts chosen by the government to
spent on the two types of public goods in both periods. There are three sources of gov-
ernment revenue (right hand side). The focus is on the alternative choice of debt versus
inﬂation taxation. Seigniorage is a government instrument both in period 1, S1, as well as
in period 2, S2. At the same time, the government can choose to borrow on international
credit markets in period 1, but has to repay its debt D, which is done in the ﬁnal period
(so that the model is closed). If the government discount factor ρ in equation (1) equalled
the international discount factor, 1
1+r, the government would always want to increase debt
under political instability because there is a chance that another government would have to
repay the debt. However, r is endogenous (as discussed further down) and the government
is, therefore, price constrained in its choice of D. Following the parsimonious model notion,
ordinary taxation is modelled at a rudimentary level only. It is calculated from exogenous
tax rate τ and exogenous tax base ¯ Y .4
4 This implies two simplifying assumptions: (i) this is a no growth economy; and (ii) the tax rate cannot
be changed. It also implies that taxes are non-distortionary.
6The private sector budget constraints for both periods are simply:
C1 ≤ (1 − τ)¯ Y − S1 − γ(S1). (5)
C2 ≤ (1 − τ)¯ Y − S2 − γ(S2).
Each period real private consumption depends on real income net of non-distortionary taxes
minus inﬂation taxation and its deadweight loss γ. The function γ is assumed to be rising
and convex in seigniorage (γ0 > 0, γ00 > 0). Intuitively, this is a reasonable (though not
compelling) assumption because the marginal increase in seigniorage at a higher level of
seigniorage is typically associated with a more substantial rise in inﬂation compared to the
rise of inﬂation at a lower level of seigniorage (Cagan, 1956).5 For simplicity, it is assumed
that γ is the same in both periods, but this has no bearing on the results.
The model could be interpreted in per capita terms, but the private sector is passive in the
sense that it cannot take optimizing decisions on labor, savings or investment. Thus, there
is no income growth and the two private sector budget constraints are not directly linked
intertemporally. With regard to the privat sector budget constraint the model is similar to
the model in Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992).
4 Model: Debt and Debt Conditionality
In a previous paper (Bohn, 2002), debt was modelled to be quantity-constrained. The idea
was to investigate the eﬀect of debt conditionality controlled by international ﬁnancial insti-
5 Direct welfare costs include the shoe leather, the Olivera-Tanzi and redistribution eﬀects. It suﬃces
that the overall eﬀect of inﬂation on welfare costs are linear, it may even be slightly concave. In developing
and transition economies the eﬀect of inﬂation on welfare costs is, however, more likely to be convex because
high levels of inﬂation typically also erode the trust of the private sector in using the national currency for
transactions. Thereby, the levels of barter trade and currency substitution in the economy are raised.
Thus welfare losses are caused by seigniorage directly as well as through its eﬀect on barter and currency
substitution. Barter has been a problem in many developing and transition countries, in particular in
Russia, and currency substitution was a wide-spread problem, for instance, in Eastern European as well as
Latin American countries.
7tutions like the IMF. The country in question is supposed to have lost its credit-worthiness
with commercial lenders. In that context, it makes sense to assume a ﬁxed interest rate, at
which, say, the IMF, lends a certain amount of funds, which depends on some performance
criteria (debt conditionality).
Here, a broader view is taken. We assume that the country in question has full access to
international credit markets. There is no debt ceiling; instead, debt is price-constrained: the
more the country wants to borrow, the higher the interest rate. In addition, international
ﬁnancial institutions still exert some inﬂuence. If they withdraw (part of) their credits
because the country fails to fulﬁll certain debt conditionality criteria, the interest rate rises,
but the country is still able to borrow from commercial lenders.
The willingness of international ﬁnancial institutions like the IMF or the World Bank to lend
depends on criteria referred to as debt conditionality. The aim is not only to avoid default
and ensure repayment; instead debt conditionality is typically motivated by more general
considerations such as economic and political stability or long run growth. In this paper, two
performance criteria (Ray, 1998) as employed by the IMF (Guiti´ an, 1995) are used: (i) deﬁcit
to GDP ratio (deﬁcit reduction criterion); and (ii) money supply growth ( ˆ M, monetary
solidity criterion). As GDP equals exogenous income here, the GDP ratio criterion (i)
reduces to deﬁcit (equal to debt D in this model). As for the monetary solidity criterion (ii)
we derive the following relationship between S and ˆ M from the quantity equation (M ∗V =







and the exogeneity of Y in the ﬁrst period: S = ˆ M
¯ Y
V . Instead of basing the criterion on the
money supply growth rate, it can also be based on seigniorage S (while acknowledging that
ﬂuctuations in V can aﬀect S).
85 Model: Endogenous Interest Rate
While incorporating both commercial and institutional lenders, the interest rate equation
remains fairly general:
r = ζ(D,φ(D,S1,δ,σ)) = ψ(D,S1,δ,σ). (6)
The ζ function distinguishes between the positive impact of an increase of the quantity of
debt on the interest rate and the equally positive eﬀect of debt conditionality function φ,
where δ and σ represent IMF conditionalities with respect to deﬁcit (which corresponds to
debt D in this 2-period model) and inﬂation (which is measured by seigniorage in period 1,
S1). Most of the following assumptions on equation (6) are straightforward:
(i) ψk > 0, where k = D,S1,δ,σ (7)
(ii) ψDD > 0,
(iii) ψS1S1 ≥ 0 or
(1 − γ0)2V 00 − γ00V 0
ρβ
≤ ψS1S1 < 0,
(iv) ψDS1 = ψS1D ≥ 0,
(v) ψDδ > 0 and ψS1σ > 0,
(vi) ψDσ = 0 and ψS1δ = 0,
Raising debt D, seigniorage S1 or debt conditionalities γ and δ leads to an increase in the
interest rate - as described by (i). Assumption (ii) reﬂects the dominant direct eﬀect of D
on the interest rate: at high levels of D, the interest rate explodes. Unsustainable levels of
debt lead to prohibitive interest rates. Assumption (iii) refers to the second derivative with
respect to S1. It may be negative, but must be above some threshold (where β refers to
political instability and polarisation as discussed in section 7) to ensure that our government
9decision problem is a well-deﬁned maximisation problem. One could have also made an
argument for a direct eﬀect of S1 in ζ along the lines of assumption (ii). Assumption (iv)
says that the cross-derivatives should, obviously, be non-negative. Assumptions (v) and (vi)
reﬂect the idea of a conditionality, which means that the marginal eﬀect of D (S1) on the
interest rate is increased by a rise in its respective conditionality factor δ (σ), but there are
no cross-eﬀects.
Even though the interest rate rises with reduced monetary (S1 > 0) and ﬁscal (D > 0)
solidity, strategic default or debt renegotiations are not envisaged. There are three reasons
for not incorporating either of them in the model: (i), from conceptual point of view, the
focus of the paper is on the choice between debt and seigniorage under political instability,
not on the strategic game between the government and the international community (which
is also interesting, but another paper); (ii), from a methodological point of view, it is diﬃcult
to capture both political instability and default in one and the same model (analytical
results of a 2-period model would certainly not be possible); and (iii), empirically, default
is much less relevant than commonly thought. According to International Development
Association and International Monetary Fund (IDA and IMF, 2001) the incidence of recent
debt rescheduling was only 12 percent in the group of some 60 countries which do not belong
to the HIPC group (so-called heavily indebted poor countries).
6 Solution: Time-Inconsistency and Decomposition of the Gov-
ernment Maximization Problem
The government maximization problem and its solution are not straightforward for two
reasons: (i) there is a time-inconsistency problem; and (ii) there are too many instruments.
The time-inconsistency problem arises because the uncertainty about which government is
in power is resolved before the government decides about seigniorage S2 and public goods
F2, G2 in the second period. Hence the government would have to reoptimise, if this
10were not taken into account. Therefore, the solution involves backward induction and the
government optimisation in the ﬁrst period is constrained by the optimal decision taken
by any government in period 2. The maximisation problem for alternative policymakers is
discussed in section 8.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to study ﬁrst the maximisation problem in the ﬁrst period as if
there were no time-inconsistency problem: the government maximises total utility function
(1) subject to constraints (4) and (5). The government has two types of instruments at
its disposal: (i) its revenue choice between seigniorage and debt (S1, S2, D); and (ii) its
decision on public spending on each of the two public goods in both periods (F1, G1, F2,
G2). Increasing this period’s revenue and spending it on public goods in period 1 raises
contemporaneous public goods utility H. If the increase in revenue is due to an increase in
period 1 seigniorage, government utility derived from private sector consumption is reduced
at the same time. If it is paid for by more credits, the additional debt has to be repaid in
period 2, which reduces funds available for public goods in period 2 and hence decreases
utility derived from them.
The government decision problem is made tractable because of three assumptions: (i), gov-
ernment spending F and G is expenditure on public goods and does, therefore, not appear
in the private sector budget constraints (5); (ii), government objective function (1) is ad-
ditively separable; (iii), the functional format of the polarization assumption embedded in
equation (2) guarantees H(G,F) = F +G (equation 3). Due to assumptions (i) and (ii) the
government optimization problem can be decomposed into two problems: ﬁrst, the optimal
distribution of the total public goods spending between F and G (distribution prob-
lem); and second, the fundamental revenue and expenditure problem of the government
(fundamental problem).
The (optimal) distribution problem for public goods spending is not really interesting and
it is only required for being able to solve the fundamental revenue and expenditure problem
of the government. Due to assumption (iii) the fundamental problem of the government
11is independent of the actual government in power and the public sector budget constraints
(4) can be inserted into total utility function (1) (see next section). Nonetheless, the fact
that there are two potential governments does have crucial implications for any government
decision on the total amount of public goods spending as well as on the source of revenue. In
fact, the model is constructed that way to allow for the analysis of political instability as such
(as, for instance, in Devereux and Wen, 1998, or Svensson, 1998) as opposed to analyzing the
eﬀect of diﬀerent types of government with diﬀerent objectives (as, for instance, in Aghion
and Bolton, 1990, or Tabellini and Alesina, 1990).
We proceed as follows. In the next section (section 7), the solution for the optimal public
goods distribution problem is used to simplify total government utility and, thereby, make
the government maximization problem tractable. Then the second period maximisation
problem is formally solved (section 8) to be able to discuss the fundamental problem of
government revenue and expenditure (section 9). Finally, we analyse the eﬀect of marginal
changes of exogenous parameters on the optimal government choice on seigniorage and debt
(perturbation results) in sections 10-12.
7 Solution: Simplifying Total Public Goods Utility
Assumption (iii), which refers to the functional format of public goods utility function H,
has three speciﬁc implications. First, the optimal distribution of the total partial interest
spending between F and G is crosswise symmetrical for both types, say i and k, of govern-
ments (when in power). Second, public goods utility H derived from type i’s choice of F















12In either case, the marginal public goods utility is unity. Third, the (real) total value of
public goods spending H is normalized - for each government - by the sum of its arguments
(F + G), when chosen optimally by any incumbent government. For i and k representing
diﬀerent governments and α > 1
2 being assumed (without loss of generality), note, however,
that government k’s optimal choice for F and G is, of course, suboptimal for government i:
Xi = Hi(Gi,F i) > Hi(Gk,F k) = 1−α
α Xi.
On this basis, the government’s total utility function (1) can be simpliﬁed. For each period
separately, utility derived from private consumption and from public goods spending is
considered for the government in power in period 1 only. In the following, superscripts are
only used for the other government (marked by k). In period 1, this government’s optimal
choice for F and G results in H(G1,F1) = X1. Thus ﬁrst period public goods utility is
V (C1) + H(G1,F1) = V (C1) + X1 (9)
If this government is still in power in period 2 (with probability (1 − π)), it will choose F
and G such that H(G2,F2) = X2. If, however, this government looses power in period 2
(with probability π), it has to put up with the public goods spending chosen by the other
government, i.e. H(Gk
2,F k
2 ) = 1−α
α X2. Hence its second period total expected public goods
utility is:
E { ρ ( V (C2) + H(G2,F2) )} (10)
= ρ






= ρ ( V (C2) + β(α,π)X2 )
Thus public goods utility in period 2 depends on three exogenous parameters: discount
factor ρ, political polarization α and the probability of loosing power π. The latter two
parameters are subsumed under quasi-exogenous parameter β, which is to represent political
13instability: 0 ≤ β(α,π) = (1 − π) + π 1−α
α ≤ 1. Note that political instability augments the
eﬀect of the discount factor: it lowers the valuation for the second period, i.e. it increases
government myopia. Obviously, β = 1 if both governments have identical preferences (α =
1
2) or if the government stays in power with certainty (π = 0). For α = 1 and π = 1, β = 0.
In other words, β decreases with more political diversity (polarization α ↑) and/or more
political uncertainty (probability of government change π ↑).
8 Solution: Second Period Maximisation
Due to the time-inconsistency problem the second period maximisation problem must be
solved ﬁrst in order to obtain the overall solution:
max
S2,F2,G2





2) j = i,k (11)
s.t. G2 + F2 + (1 + r)D ≤ τ ¯ Y + S2
C2 ≤ (1 − τ)¯ Y − S2 − γ(S2).
As the uncertainty of who chooses F2 and G2 is resolved, the expectation operator on public
sector utility H vanishes. From equation (8) we know that both governments choose diﬀerent
levels of F2 and G2, but both governments’ choices result in the same level of public goods
utility. Hence constraint (i) can be substituted in irrespective of the government in power.
With constraint (ii) also substituted in, we obtain the identical maximisation problem for
either government and hence the identical optimal choice for S2 (which could be used to
solve the distribution problem by deriving H(G2,F2) = F2+G2 and hence F2 and G2). The
ﬁrst order condition (FOC) for second period optimisation is:
(−1 − γ
0(S2)) V
0(C2) + 1 = 0, (12)
14which simply states for period 2 that the loss in marginal private consumption utility due
to an increase in seigniorage must equal the gain in marginal public goods utility (which is
unity according to equation (3)).
9 Solution: Fundamental Problem of the Government
The fundamental revenue and expenditure problem of the government can now be speciﬁed
on the basis of government preferences as stated in (1) and equations (9) and (10). Govern-
ment budget constraints (4) and private sector budget constraints (5) can be substituted
into equations (9) and (10) for Ft + Gt =: Xt and Ct, t = 1,2, respectively. Consider-



















τ ¯ Y + S2 − (1 + ψ)D

+ λ ((−1 − γ
0(S2)) V
0(C2) + 1 )
We obtain three ﬁrst order conditions, with respect to S1, D and λ. The latter corresponds




0(C1) + 1 − ρβψS1 = 0 (14)
1 − (1 + ψ)ρβ − ρβDψD = 0
The ﬁrst FOC requires that the marginal gain in public goods utility due to a marginal
increase in ﬁrst period seigniorage (which is unity due to assumption 2) equals the marginal
15disutility of reduced ﬁrst period private consumption plus the marginal disutility of dis-
counted second period public consumption (which depends on the reaction of interest rate
r on increased ﬁrst period seigniorage, ψS1). The second FOC equates the marginal gain
in public goods utility in period 1 due to a marginal increase in debt (which is unity) with
its discounted disutility in period 2. The latter consists of two eﬀects, a volume eﬀect of
increased D (which is (1+ψ)ρβ) and a price eﬀect depending on the reaction of interest rate
r on marginally increased debt D, ψD. Note that the discount factor is ρβ, i.e. it includes
the impact of political instability.
FOCs help to understand the mechanisms of the model and provide some prima facie un-
derstanding of eﬀects, but they do not capture any feedback eﬀects. The rest of the formal
solution is technical and will only be sketched out here. Two more steps are required. First,
FOCs are, of course, only the necessary conditions. The suﬃcient condition for a maximum
is that the determinant of the Bordered Hessian of (13) must be positive. Finally, we want
to characterize the impact of marginal changes of exogenous parameters on optimal values
for government instruments. In the following, perturbation results are obtained for the four
exogenous parameters of the model. The probability of government change π and political
polarisation α are subsumed by β, the political instability parameter, which was introduced
in equation (10). Parameters δ and σ indicate debt conditionality with respect to deﬁcit and
seigniorage, respectively. For all of these, perturbation results can be obtained, for instance,
by deriving total diﬀerentials and using the Cramer Rule. There is no impact on second
period seigniorage of any of the exogenous parameters, because second period optimisation
is completely separate as derived in equation (12). For debt and ﬁrst period seigniorage the
results are as follows.
1610 Result: Political Instability
First, we are interested in the eﬀect of political instability β on the optimal government
choice of debt and seigniorage in period 1. Remember that both the probability of govern-
ment change π and political polarization α are negatively related to β, which takes values
between 0 (complete instability) and 1 (perfect stability). Applying total diﬀerentials leads
to the following perturbation result, which holds at the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Political Instability)
The impact of increased political instability (lower β) on debt and ﬁrst period seigniorage
depends on the speciﬁc functional format of the interest rate equation (as well as the func-






Increased political instability means that the second period is less valued. Debt is now a
less costly source of revenue than seigniorage. Additional debt can be aﬀorded because
repayment in the second period is less likely, i.e. the second period is discounted more
heavily. Given that there is more revenue now, it is optimal to reduce seigniorage in order
to reduce the negative eﬀect of seigniorage and its deadweight loss on private sector utility.
There are three eﬀects on the second period government budget constraint, two price and
a quantity eﬀect. On the one hand, more debt in period 1 increases the interest rate and
implies higher levels of debt repayment. On the other hand, less seigniorage has a partly
oﬀsetting eﬀect through its dampening impact on the interest rate. Overall, the burden on
6 Confer appendix B for a suﬃcient condition and for the result, when S1 does not aﬀect the interest
rate (in violation of assumptions 7).
17the second period government budget constraint is, however, increased. ”Normal reaction”
means that this is due to a rising level of debt.
This ”normal reaction” is likely to occur, even if ψS1 > 0 and large. However, an ”abnormal
reaction” cannot be excluded. Perturbation results based on general functional formats are
to complex to give a clear analytical answer. Nonetheless, not much would be gained by
producing an ”abnormal reaction” in a simulation exercise. The logic is clear and is outlined
in the following.
If the eﬀect of S1 on the interest rate is large, it is optimal for the government to choose a
low level of ﬁrst period seigniorage irrespective of the existing degree of political instability.
When political instability increases (lower β), it is less costly for the government to strain
the public budget in the second period. Under speciﬁc functional formats and parameter
constellations, the optimal way of exploiting this may be to increase the interest rate by
raising the level of seigniorage while reducing the level of debt. The latter has 2 eﬀects. It
reduces the debt repayment and has a dampening eﬀect on the interest rate, thereby (partly)
oﬀsetting the increase caused by the higher level of seigniorage. First period public goods
utility is increased, if the increase in seigniorage is larger that the reduction in debt. Then,
under speciﬁc constellations, the welfare gain from increased ﬁrst period public revenue may
outweigh the loss caused by the increase in seigniorage. The loss includes: (i) the eﬀect of
higher seigniorage on the reduction of ﬁrst period private sector utility; and (ii) the net
eﬀect of the ﬁrst period public revenue composition on second period public goods utility
(which comprises the aforementioned two price and one quantity eﬀects on debt repayment).
The ”abnormal reaction” seems highly constructed, but is theoretically possible.
11 Discussion: Political Instability
The main result of this paper, the aforementioned ”normal reaction” for the trade-oﬀ be-
tween debt and seigniorage was already obtained in a much more speciﬁc setting in Bohn
18(2002). In that paper, debt is quantity constrained by international ﬁnancial institutions,
not price constrained as in this paper. The idea is that the country in question has voided
all other sources of debt. Only institutions like the IMF determine the amount of debt they
are willing to lend depending on debt conditionality based on ﬁscal and monetary criteria.
Both this paper and Bohn (2002) conﬁrm the standard result of political instability pro-
ducing myopic behaviour. However, they contradict the ﬁnding that the myopia results in
more seigniorage. That result was obtained in Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992),
where the government chooses to ﬁnance its budget with more inﬂationary ﬁnance while
postponing structural reform. It was also obtained in Bohn (2000), where the government
responds to debt conditionality based on monetary solidity by limiting inﬂationary ﬁnance
this period in order to be eligible for higher levels of international credits next period.
In this paper as in Bohn (2002), there are debt conditionalities based on seigniorage as
well as debt. These conditionalities are modelled as contemporaneous links. Both models
reveal a trade-oﬀ between ﬁscal and monetary conditionality: myopia produced by political
instability typically leads to less seigniorage and more debt.
12 Result and Discussion: Debt Conditionality
Here, we are interested in the eﬀect of debt conditionalities σ and δ (based on seigniorage
and deﬁcit, respectively) on the optimal government choice of debt and seigniorage in period
1. For both conditionalities, we consider the case where an increase in σ or δ translates into
a higher interest rate charged for credits. However, the functional format remains general.
Applying total diﬀerentials leads to the following perturbation result, which holds at the
equilibrium.









The impact of increased debt conditionalites (higher σ, higher δ) on debt and ﬁrst period
seigniorage is as expected: conditionality on itself leads to a reduction, conditionality on the
alternative source of revenue produces an increase. As in Bohn (2002) the trade-oﬀ eﬀect of
the two conditionalities is conﬁrmed. The ﬁndings indicate, therefore, that it is diﬃcult for
international ﬁnancial institutions to achieve both objectives, monetary and ﬁscal solidity,
at the same time.
13 Conclusion
This paper introduces a parsimonious framework for studying the problem of optimal gov-
ernment ﬁnance under political instability. It is suited to analyse the case of developing and
transition countries, where political instability is inherent to the political structure of the
country rather than caused by electoral uncertainty as in Western democracies. A coun-
try’s political situation is characterised by its uncertainty about government change and its
political polarisation within society. Alternative means for ﬁnancing government spending
on public goods are considered: taxation, seigniorage, and foreign debt. The amount of
available debt is determined by an interest rate, which is aﬀected both by market conditions
and debt conditionality (the latter being imposed by international ﬁnancial institutions like
the IMF).
Two main conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, political instability does lead to
myopic government behaviour as argued in the literature. However, it is not optimal for the
20government to increase revenue by expanding seigniorage. This result contradicts earlier
ﬁndings by Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and Bohn (2000). Contrary to these
previous models, here, debt and seigniorage are alternative sources of current period govern-
ment revenue.7 An increase in political instability leads to myopic behaviour, because there
is a lower valuation of debt repayment obligations in the future. Hence the government typ-
ically desires a higher level of debt. Total government revenue is increased while optimality
requires a reduction of seigniorage. The ﬁndings parallel those in Bohn (2002), even though
the setting is much more general in this paper. Foreign debt is not only determined by debt
conditionality as in Bohn (2002), but also inﬂuenced by international credit markets.
The second conclusion deals with eﬀects of debt conditionality. Conditionalities based on
monetary and ﬁscal solidity both reveal an important trade-oﬀ which arises from the fact
that seigniorage and debt are alternative sources of current period government revenue.
Conditionality on itself leads to a reduction, conditionality on the alternative source of rev-
enue produces an increase. As in Bohn (2002) the trade-oﬀ eﬀect of the two conditionalities
is conﬁrmed. These results cast doubt on the ferocity with which the IMF used to require
debtor countries to achieve monetary and ﬁscal solidity at the same time. But our ﬁndings
take us one step further: we can draw policy recommendations. According to the model,
the trade-oﬀ between deﬁcit reduction and monetary consolidation can be avoided, if debt
conditionality alternatively refers to deﬁcit or to seigniorage, but not to both. Which one
to focus on depends on a judgement of the relative desirability of monetary versus ﬁscal
solidity objectives.
Future work on public ﬁnance under political instability and debt conditionality could go in
various direction. The ﬁrst one refers to work in progress. We are going to test empirically
the eﬀects of debt conditionality and political instability studied in previous theoretical
papers. Preliminary work indicates that this is going to be a diﬃcult task. While there
7 In Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), foreign debt is ignored. Bohn (2000) only captures future
foreign debt in response to the seigniorage decision in the current period.
21is data on political instability, data capturing the link between interest rates and debt
conditionality applied to individual countries is not readily available. Such empirical work
might, however, help shed more light on the eﬀectiveness of (previous) IMF policies.
As for theoretical work, a natural complement to this short run model is a long run perspec-
tive including, nonetheless, political instability. This could be done in an inﬁnite horizon
framework or, possibly, in a three-period model. Not only would additional time periods
contribute to a more complex model structure, but a number of additional issues would have
to be addressed, for instance: (i) how to include growth in the model and study its impact
on political instability; (ii) how to incorporate a government tax instrument; and (iii) how
to include debt repayment in such a long run model. In a more extended framework that
includes some of the above issues it might be conjectured that a certain initial level of po-
litical stability is required as a precondition for getting on a path of recovery. We might, for
instance, get a multiple equilibria story for optimal government behaviour under political
instability similar to the one obtained by, for instance, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) for optimal
rent-seeking behaviour.
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iAppendix
A Optimal Public Goods Spending
The following exposition draws on Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992). The same
approach is also used in Svensson (1998). For convenience, polarisation assumption (2) which
is embedded in the government utility function H for public goods spending is restated for














As the utility function H for the type k government is symmetrical according to its deﬁnition
in section 2, so is the optimal distribution between F k and Gk: (1 − α)Gk = αF k.











By reinserting into utility function (A-1) the optimal values for F and G in terms of X














iiWe can now see that the denominator in equation (A-1) was chosen as a normalisation such
that the marginal public goods utility is unity. Furthermore, given that utility function
(A-1) is symmetrical for both types of government, the optimal values for F and G are










B Suﬃcient Condition for Proposition 1
Suﬃcient conditions for the ”normal reaction” stated in proposition 1 are as follows:
For dS1
dβ > 0, it suﬃces that
ψ(DψD + D
2ψDD − 1 − ψ) < DψDS1(1 + ψ + DψD) (B.1)
Given that the right hand side is positive, a more restrictive suﬃcient condition is that
either term on the left hand side is smaller or equal to 0. ψS1 = 0 is suﬃcient, but would
violate assumption 7 (i). Alternatively, the following is suﬃcient:
DψD + D
2ψDD − 1 − ψ < 0. (B.2)
For dD
dβ < 0, it suﬃces that












[1 + ψ + DψD] (B.3)
The term in the second square brackets on the right hand side is positive, whereas the one
in the ﬁrst square brackets is negative for ψS1S1 ≥ 0. (The latter term is still likely to be
negative, even if ψS1S1 turns negative as long as it remains within the limits prescribed by
assumption 7 (iii)). Hence the condition is certainly fulﬁlled for ψS1 = 0 and for ψS1 > 0,
but small. It may even be fulﬁlled for larger values of ψS1.
iii